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The Muslim Identity and the Politics of Fundamentalism in Kashmir
An attempt is being made in this paper to analyse the factor of religion in the process of
formation and assertion of political identity in Kashmir. This analysis assumes importance in
the context of fundamentalist trends in the recent politics of Kashmir, especially in the wake of
militancy in the decade of nineties. Kashmir’s politics has been traditionally hailed as secular in
its roots and orientations but in the recent years it has displayed a drift towards Islamization
which has affected a consequential space of its politics. A shift seems to have occurred  both in
the nature of the normative order as well as in the direction of political responses of the
people. This shift needs to be explained and placed in the context of politicisation of the
community. What specifically needs to be explained is the ‘Muslim factor’ in the political
identity of Kashmir. It is important in this context, to understand firstly, the bearing that the
Muslim reality of the Kashmiris has on their political responses and, secondly, the political
circumstances in which this reality acquires  a communal and fundamentalist form. Such an
analysis needs to be based on an understanding of the factors underlying the political identity
in general, and  the process of political mobilisation of the community, in particular.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the meaning of Islam for
the people of Kashmir. The second section deals with the process of the formation of the
Kashmiri political identity and the factor of Islam in the process of politicisation of Kashmiris.
In third section an analysis of  the factors underlying the process of secularisation of the
political identity is undertaken and in the fourth section the politics of fundamentalism in the
present context is analysed. 
I Kashmiri Identity and the Meaning of Islam
For an understanding of the meaning of Islam for the people of Kashmir, it is important to
point out three factors that have given a context of specificity to the question of religion -  the
first factor that  relates to the philosophical tradition of Kashmir, the  second that points  to
the  Sufi Order as the basis of propagation of Islam, and the third that suggests the continuity
in the cultural patterns despite changes at the religious levels. All these factors have led to a
distinct conception of Islam that is peculiar to Kashmir. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 3
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Kashmir has  had a rich philosophical tradition. In the past, it was an important centre of
learning and made important contributions to the fields of philosophy, religion, poetry,
grammar. ‘There was scarcely any branch of learning which the people of Kashmir had not
studied and to which they did not make their original contributions.’  Its geographical location
1
at a point where a number of countries meet made it open to various kinds of ideas that came
along with the travellers, traders and scholars. It was a result of such an interaction of ideas
that there evolved an openness within the culture that allowed a relative freedom for
expression of varying religious and philosophical beliefs. Such an openness was symbolised in
the Trika philosophy -  an indigenous system of ideas which represented a fusion of ancient
Vedic and Buddhist philosophy and culture. Trika had, in fact emerged as a form of Kashmiri
Shaivism but it was quite distinct  from other kinds of Shaiva philosophies  as available within
the Indian subcontinent. It was characterised by ‘absolute monism’ and dealt with three vital
matters, namely the man, the universe and the Reality. As a philosophical system not only was
it open to all human beings despite their religious dispositions, but it also encouraged
expression of divergent opinions.
The rich philosophical tradition and the resultant cultural openness had definite implications
for the religious orientations of people. Religion, therefore, could never acquire a rigid form in
Kashmir. It operated within a culture that was receptive to different ideas and allowed these to
flourish without any obstruction. That is the reason that there always existed influence of more
than one religion on the lives of people. When Shaivism was dominant one could perceive the
influence of Buddhism as well, and when Islam was popularised, the influence of Hinduism
continued to exist. The process of  transition from one religion to another was not only
smooth  but also reflected  a continuity. In the assimilation of new values, the past was not
eliminated but ‘was allowed to blend quickly with the new’.  The philosophical and cultural
2
traditions were carried over.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 4
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Islam that was introduced in Kashmir,  did not mark a break in the cultural and philosophical
traditions, though it brought about great transformation in its society.  It  was quite in tunes
3
with the philosophical way of thinking of Kashmiris. Its appeal for absolute monism fitted into
the sensibilities of people. Emphasis on personal salvation and personal devotion ‘had a
particular resonance for a population familiar with such ideas via Hinduism (especially
Shaivism) and some of the devotional aspects of Buddhism’.  Due to its gradual introduction,
4
this new religion took the form of a ‘sociological form of acculturation’. As Khan has noted,
change over to Islam was ‘ a gradual and continuous process of social transition than any felt
experience of groups in religious terms’.  It had its liberating role for the society for it came to
5
Kashmir at a time when Hindu social order was losing its philosophical basis and was not
being able to fulfil the spiritual demands of the people. It was being weighed down by the mass
of rituals and superstitions and was getting engulfed by sectarianism.  As a new religion,
6
Islam, therefore, formed the basis of a  resurgence movement and assumed its own popular
cultural form.  As a resurgence movement, it popularised idealistic, sentimental or religious
humanism and as a cultural form, it came to reflect its eclectic basis, containing the values and
the cultural gains both of Shaivism and Islam.  
7
In laying down the humanist foundations of Islam, the Sufi order played a great role. The Sufis
‘exerted enormous influence on the religious and philosophical beliefs of the people, and
moulded their mind and set up the ideal of religious tolerance and abiding faith in the grace ofQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 5
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God’.   The Sufi thinking was a continuity to the mysticism as already in vogue in Buddhism
8
and Shaivism. In the  words of Hewitt:
“Sufism with its clear emphasis on practical questions of worship and devotion, and
less concerned with the theological and speculative elements within religion, fitted
neatly into popular idioms of thirteenth century Kashmir. It also had profound
similarities to some Tantric practices. Many Muslims and Hindus became followers of
both Shaivic and Sufi preachers. Other notionally Islamic mystics, such as the rishis ,
also had followers from  different religions and had profound similarities to Shaivism.”
9
The Rishi Order made a significant contribution towards popularising Islam in its cultural
form. This Order was established by Sheikh Noor ud Din, a local Sufi mystic who was
influenced by the spiritual ideas of Lalleshwari. Lalleshwari, a Hindu mystic poet had rebelled
against the dogmatic traditions of Brahmanism and was spreading the message of humanism. It
is in the ideas of Lalleshwari , popularly known as Lalla, and Sheikh Noor ud Din, fondly
remembered as Nand Reshi, that one can see the link between the old tradition of Shaivism
and the new ideas of Islam.
Reflecting a synthetic and eclectic basis, Islam has acquired a distinct form in Kashmir. So 
unique has been this form that it has led some even to doubt its authenticity.  Such a doubt is
cast both in relation to the way of worship as well as in relation to the way of life of the
people. Lawrence notes that there is greater influence of the shrine on the life of Kashmiris
than the influence of the mosques or the Mullahs.  In his opinion, the Kashmiri Muslims never
10
gave up the old Hindu religion of the country. So he observes that ‘Kashmiri Sunnis are only
Musalman in name. In their heart, they are Hindus, and the religion of Islam is too abstract to
satisfy their superstitious craving, and they turn from the mean priest and the mean mosque toQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 6
 Ibid, 288.
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the pretty shrines of carved wood and roof bright with its iris flowers where the saints of the
past time are buried.’   It is in the similar vein that Sufi observes:
11
‘He (Kashmiri) almost justifies to this day the observations recorded by Mirza Haider
Dughlat about 1550 A.C.The Mirza said that so many heresies have been legitimised in
Kashmir that people know nothing of what is lawful or unlawful. The so-called ‘Pirs’
(spiritual guides) and ‘Sufis’ (mystics) are “forever interpreting dreams, displaying
miracles and obtaining from the unseen, information, regarding either the future or the
past...Consider the Holy Law (Shariat) second in importance to the True ‘Way’(
Tariquat) and that in consequence, the people of the ‘Way’ have nothing to do with the
Holy Law.”
12
Despite such observations, it may be noted that religion occupies an important role in the life
of ordinary Kashmiris. To a substantial extent it also defines their identity. Yet due to the
interaction between religion and culture the question of identity for Kashmiris assumes  a
complex nature. Religion, on its own does not provide the explanatory factor for
understanding the  Kashmiri identity. This identity reflecting the cultural heritage of Kashmir
as well as its philosophical and normative order,  incorporates the factor of religion, yet is not
limited to it.
II Process of formation of Political Identity
The process of formation and assertion of political identity vis a vis the question of religion,
has been an intricate one in Kashmir. In fact, there appears to be a vacillating Kashmiri
response to the politics based on religion. The initial stage of evolution of political
consciousness has been defined by the assertion of the Muslim identity. Yet, the later politics
has been pursued, more or less, in secular directions. There has been a  reassertion of Muslim
identity in the more  recent years. Such a vacillating response can be explained with reference
to the specificity of the time and the political circumstances. Before we attempt to analyse inQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 7
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13
detail such specificity of circumstances, it may be pertinent to note that the assertion of
political identity based on religion, does not necessarily indicate the communal basis of
politics. Kashmir has not had an extended history of communal tensions or conflicts. There has
been, on the whole, a harmony at the intra-societal level. Such a harmony is reflective of the
commonality of Kashmiri culture of which Hindus are as much a part, as the Muslims. Yet it is
in the sphere of politics that there has been a divergence between the two communities. Such a
divergence, to begin with, had been a manifestation of the variation in the socioeconomic
conditions of both the communities - a  variation that was reflected in their individual process
of politicisation as well. While the process of politicisation of the community of Muslims of
Kashmir was a result of the consciousness of  their situation of deprivation and utter
powerlessness, the politicisation of the community of Hindus was a step towards maintenance 
of their position of dominance. That explains why the political movement that took shape in
Kashmir in the decade of thirties had not much enthusiastic participation of Kashmiri Hindus.
With the exception of few progressive and vocal Kashmiri Pundits who were catalysts in the
process of secularisation of this movement, the mass of Hindus was indifferent to the political
movement at best, and opposed to it, at worst.
Assertion of Muslim Identity
The early assertion of the Muslim identity in Kashmir was a consequence of the
socioeconomic situation in which the community was placed during the Dogra rule.  The
recorded history shows that the condition of the Kashmiris during this rule was quite pitiable.
There was widespread poverty and the masses, particularly the peasantry and the artisans,
faced lots of hardships. Agriculture formed the main source of production for the majority of
the rural population, and yet the proprietary rights to land were not enjoyed by them.  Whole
of the land was considered to have been the property of the ruler. A large number of
Kashmiris who were landless labourers were working as the serfs of the absentee landlords
while many others, unable to earn sufficiently to meet their requirements and heavily indebted,
were compelled to leave the state to work as labourers in the neighbouring Punjab.  The
13
artisans were similarly  working under adverse conditions mainly due to oppressive nature ofQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 8
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taxation. Shawl manufacturing, for instance, was an industry employing large number of
Kashmiris - so oppressive were the conditions of the ordinary workers in it that it had resulted
in the  accumulated discontent. Much before the organisation of the political consciousness, a
number of agitations had erupted in this industry. Although, as Zutshi notes, there had
emerged in this industry,  a small class of the Shia Muslims who were economically dominant
and enjoyed the patronage of the state, yet, the condition of work for the majority of the wage
workers was really exploitative.  Several restrictions were placed on the manufacture of
14
shawls and the industry was heavily taxed. Besides the fact that wool was taxed and the
manufacturer was taxed for every workman he employed, there was also an enormous duty on
the finished product.  The oppressive nature of taxation during the Dogra regime has been
15
recorded by many a historians and scholars. Walter Lawerence, the Land settlement officer
who himself was responsible for introducing many revenue-related reforms, noted that almost
everything save air and water was taxed in Kashmir.  Younghusband notes that the butchers,
16
bakers, carpenters, boatmen, and even prostitutes were taxed. So much so that the poor
coolies who were engaged to carry load for travellers, had to give up, as tax,  half of their
earnings.  
17
The Dogra rulers remained quite indifferent to the pitiable condition of the masses and took no
pain in alleviating their overall condition. Sufi notes that this regime was totally unsympathetic
towards the aspirations of the people and in its attitude towards the valley it was as foreign to
it as was the British were to India.  It was because of such an insensitive attitude of the Dogra
18
regime that the Kashmiris remained the most backward community in the state. They were
among the last to take an advantage of the new opportunities thrown open by the forces of
modernisation.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 9
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It was because of the backwardness of the Kashmiri Muslims on the one hand and the
insensitive attitude of the Dogra regime, on the other, that the process of early politicisation
came to focus on the Muslim identity of Kashmiris.They perceived their deprivation in the
context of their reality as ‘Muslims’ within the Dogra ‘Hindu’ regime. For them their
backwardness was a consequence of their being subjects of a regime that was discriminatory
against Muslims in general. A number of factors, including the pro-Hindu attitude of the
administration on the one hand and the relative bias against the Muslims in the matters of
employment in the bureaucracy and army, on the other, contributed to the formation of such
perceptions. Brecher argues that the policies pursued by the Dogra ruler were so markedly
favourable to the Hindus that it was not surprising for the national movement to have
developed a communalist orientation in the first stage.  It was in accordance with the Hindu
19
interest that the conversion of religion was legally banned and slaughtering of cows was made
a capital offence.  While the rest of the communities were disarmed, the Arms Act allowed
20
the Rajputs, the dominant Dogra Hindu community, to have ‘one firearm with sufficient
ammunition per family for ‘religious ritual and worshipping’.
21
The objective situation in which Kashmiri Muslims were placed, in comparison to the
dominant classes which were mainly Hindus both from Kashmir as well as from Jammu, also
led Kashmiris to perceive their deprivation in terms of their religious identity. The main
dominant class within the state, was the class of the Dogra Rajputs. The Rajputs, were not
only socially the most privileged group in the state but also enjoyed almost a monopoly over
the administrative, military and political positions. They owned  a substantial portion of theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 10
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cultivable land in the Valley, and related  to the mass of Kashmiri peasantry as the absentee
landlords. The other dominant class of the state was that of the Kashmiri Hindus, commonly
known as the Pundits. Kashmiri Pundits had been traditionally associated with the  court and 
were having the potential to gain from the new opportunities made available by the forces of
modernisation. They were among the first to take to education and to get themselves equipped
for the highly desired as well as the highly competitive state services.  
22
Thus, in the early politicisation of the Kashmiris a linkage was established between the
backwardness and deprivation of Kashmiris as a community and their religious identity. The
prejudice in the attitude of the rulers towards the Kashmiris was interpreted in terms of
difference in later’s religious identity as compared to that of the rulers and the dominant
classes. Sheikh Abdullah has referred to early perceptions of Kashmiris, including his own, as
regards the religious identity of the Kashmiris vis a vis the rulers, in his autobiography:
‘I started to question why Muslims were singled out for such treatment? We
constituted the majority, and contributed the most towards the state’s revenues, still
we were continuously oppressed. Why? How long would we put up with it? Was it
because a majority of government servants were non-Muslims, or, because most of the
lower grade officers who dealt with the public were Kashmiri Pundits? I concluded
that the ill-treatment of Muslims was an outcome of religious prejudice.’  
23
Sheikh Abdullah belonged to the  emerging class of educated Muslims of Kashmir who were
asserting what Bazaz  calls their ‘class rights’. Articulating their political demands in specific-
24
Muslim context, they set the basis for the political movement of Kashmir. Among  the most
commonly raised demands by them were those related to the employment of the
Muhammadens in the state services, improvement in the condition of the  education forQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 11
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Kashmir’s freedom movement is considered to be born on 13th July 1931. The
26
 importance of this day lies in its being the first occasion when the  spontaneous response of
 people against the Dogra ruler came to be publicly expressed. The mass protest followed the
 arrest of an ‘outsider’ Muslim charged with the offence of inciting local Muslims to massacre the
 Hindus. As many as  21 persons died as a result of police firing. The day is celebrated in Kashmir
 as the ‘Martyrs’ Day’.
Muslims, etc. For pursuing their demands in an organised manner they had established the
Reading Room Party. It comprised  of  young educated Muslims of Kashmir.The main
purpose of this organisation was to press for more jobs for the educated Muslims. It was to
become a precursor to the political movement and had the effect of early politicisation of the
educated middle class Kashmiri Muslims.
In this early stage of the evolution of the political consciousness in Kashmir, the religious
institutions were to play a significant role. The Reading Room Party worked with the full
cooperation of the two Mir Waizes, the  religious heads of Srinagar.  The institution of the
25
Mir Waiz, representing  an altogether  new tradition of religion, in accordance with which  a
single centre - of religious authority as well as of the mass following was created, was actively
involved in the process of educating the Muslims. Such involvement provided Kashmir with
many of political leaders including Sheikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg and G.M. Sadiq. There
was also, in this period, a substantial use of the mosques for the political mobilization of  the
Kashmiris. As a ban was imposed by the Dogra regime on all types of societies, whether
social, religious or political, it was from the mosques only that the small class of intelligentsia
could involve the masses into the political movement.
It was with respect to the Muslim identity of the people only that the first expression of the
mass discontent could be perceived in Kashmir. The mass expression of the people of Kashmir
on 13th July, 1931, the day known as the landmark in the political movement in Kashmir,
manifested a politicised Muslim identity . The spontaneous political response that was the
26
manifestation of the deep-rooted discontent of the masses against the Dogra administrationQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 12
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had an exceptional but a definite communal content that could be revealed through the
communal outburst in Kashmir at that time.  Such a communal outburst that shook the
27
traditional amity and goodwill between the Hindus and Muslims, was not only unprecedented
but was also not to have a parallel even in the later years.
Despite its apparently communal nature,  the significance of this first mass political response of
Kashmiris cannot be in any way considered to be limited to its communal dimension. One may
reasonably argue along with Gias ud-din that the 1931 revolt was, besides a  Muslim revolt,
also, ‘... an authentic revolt of the people of the state against the political, social and economic
oppression by the ruling class and their henchmen. The rebellious elements were the Muslim
intelligentsia, the trading class and the mass of the peasantry who were groaning under the
feudal rule.’  This revolt of the people was to take, later,  a substantiative political and
28
economic form and had to help Kashmiris rise above their Muslim consciousness. Yet in the
earlier years, it could not manifest itself except through such consciousness that was getting
sharpened in the early twentieth century.
In sharpening  the Muslim consciousness of Kashmir, the role of the Muslims outside the
Valley was quite significant. Outside the state, there was a lobby of Muslims which was
actively involved in voicing the problems of the Kashmiri Muslims. Kashmir, according to
Samad, has been,  historically   a sensitive issue in Muslim Punjab. To a substantial extent this
has been due to the influence of the Kashmiri Biradari.  According to him a  large number of
Kashmiris had migrated to Punjab due to the natural disasters as well as due to the Dogra
oppression. A number of these Kashmiris were also influential people belonging to the rais
families or class of professionals. These people of Kashmiri origin, in Punjab, in the beginning
of the decade of thirties had started mobilizing other Muslims of Punjab and with their helpQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 13
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It may be noted that the political response of Muslims of Jammu was organised on the
31
 lines of the the Muslims of the rest of the northern India and that the influence of the politics of
 the Muslim League on it was complete. That is the reason that the Jammu Muslims neither could
 accept the secularisation of the Kashmir politics nor could they continue their affiliation with the
 National Conference after its conversion from the Muslim Conference.They, in fact, revived the
 Muslim Conference and through this organisation made all efforts to influence the political
 responses in Kashmir. 
had initiated an organised campaign  in support of the Muslims of Kashmir.    It was the result
29
of such a campaign that All-India Kashmir Muslim Conference was formed. This organisation
functioned from Lahore and was actively involved not only in campaigning for the Muslims of
Kashmir but also in  providing them material and emotional support.
It was the result of the  politicisation of Muslim political identity of  Kashmiris that their first
organised political response was reflected in the form of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference.  Muslim Conference that was established in 1932 clearly manifested  the political
interest of the Muslims of the state. In the establishment of this organisation, the presumption
of a united Muslim response within the state was pursued. This kind of initial political
response was inevitable to the educated youth of Kashmir who were exposed to the ideas of
Pan-Islamism during their education in the Indian Universities, specifically, Aligarh. It was
inevitable for them to find a common cause  with the Muslims of the rest of India, specifically,
those within the state.   As the political movement reached its maturity and as the regional
30
political aspirations became more predominant, such a unity across the geographical and
cultural boundary of Kashmir, on the basis of religion, could not sustain itself.
31QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 14
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III Secularisation of Political Identity
Despite the fact that the Muslim identity was first to be politicised, it could not define the
politics of Kashmir for a long time. Even as the early political responses were evolving on the
basis of Muslim identity, a number of political leaders were reflecting their discomfort
especially in the context of the sharpening of the communal responses and consequent
communal tensions within the state. Such a politics, in their opinion, did not match with  the
traditional ethos of Kashmir and had the impact of shaking the roots of  harmony existing
between Hindus and Muslims.  Sheikh Abdullah personally felt that communal nature of
32
politics in general and the restrictive nature of the Muslim Conference, in particular, had the
limiting effect on the very nature and the purpose of the political movement. So he initiated a 
campaign for widening the base both of the party as well as of the movement. In 1935, he
found an Urdu weekly in collaboration with a prominent Hindu leader, Prem Nath Bazaz and
used it to make a case for extending the ideological base and the support structure of the
movement. It was mainly because of the persisting efforts of Sheikh Abdullah that Muslim
Conference later altered its name and amended its constitution to make it possible for ‘all the
progressive forces in the country’ to be rallied under one banner to fight for the achievement
of the responsible government. The membership of the National Conference was, therefore,
opened to all ‘irrespective of their caste, creed or religion’. Soon the leadership of this
organisation was to raise a ‘National Demand’ with the aim of bringing about complete change
in the social and political outlook of the people and  achieving responsible government.
This second phase of the political movement, under the leadership of the National Conference,
provides significant insights into the process of construction of political identity as well as the
political responses of the people of Kashmir. Political identity that came to assert itself at this
time had not only transcended its narrow religious limitations but also had come to acquire a
politically seasoned form. It was a political identity that took the Kashmiri social and cultural
ethos as its foundational point, its historical subjugation for centuries under  alien political
control,  as the basis of its collective consciousness and, emancipation of its masses from theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 15
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economically and politically oppressive systems, as the reference points of  its organised
resistance. This political identity was also to reflect a sense of ‘political community’  that had
been gradually shaping itself.
The nature of political movement in this phase was quite different from what it was in the
initial period -  at least in three terms - firstly, in terms of transcendence of  narrow limits of
elite politics and extension of the mass base, secondly, radicalisation and secularisation of
goals underlying the political movement and thirdly, in terms of  formation of a concrete
ideological and normative structure. The mass base  and the radicalisation of politics were, in
fact, interlinked processes. As the masses were incorporated into the movement,  the political
agenda came to reflect their interest. It was due to its successful strategy of mass-mobilisation
that National Conference was to reflect a strong rural base in Kashmir, especially within the
class of peasantry. It was this rural base of the Conference that led to a substantiative
socioeconomic content in the political movement.
The linkage of the peasantry with the National Conference is very important for understanding
the process of secularisation of political identity in Kashmir, because as we shall see later in
this paper, the assertion of the Muslim identity and rise of fundamentalist forces in seventies,
has been, to a large extent, a consequence of the erosion of the mass-support of the National
Conference, specifically, within the rural peasantry. One of the factors that had contributed to
the process of subduing the communal basis of politics in the decade of thirties was the
channelisation of the grievances of the mass of peasantry into the radical demand of  the ‘land
to the tiller’. This objective was consciously incorporated into the National Conference politics
because Abdullah was clear that it was of utmost importance to divert the minds of the
majority of the people from the communal issues. He would rather let them ‘concentrate their
thoughts and energies on problems which really matter, the economic problems’.  Land being
33
one of the major issues for the mass of the economically oppressed and exploited peasantry, 
politics of land reforms had a definite impact on the political psyche of people. This could beQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 16
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perceived from the nature of Kashmir’s politics in the decade of forties. With land reforms
adding a substantiative social content,  politics, shedding its communal nature,  acquired a
socially purposive and  politically efficacious nature. Muslim religion of the farmers did not
loom any longer as a serious issue as large segments of the farm population had been
‘successfully induced to shift their attention from religious to economic matters.’
34
[Ladejinsky, 188-189] 
In bringing the agenda of the land reform to the forefront of the political movement, the Indian
Communists had a role to play. The National Conference was penetrated by the communist
influence in the decade of thirties and forties. Communist leaders from Punjab had been
actively monitoring the political movement in Kashmir. It was due to their close alliance with
the National Conference during this phase of the political movement that not only a left-
oriented cadre emerged within the party, but the concrete ideological structure of the party
was also chalked out in the lines of the communist ideology. The New Kashmir Manifesto, the
blueprint of the Conference, was a document that was set in the language that was typical of a
communist document. It not only addressed the issue of the land reforms but also the issues
related to the right of the workers and other oppressed classes, including the women.
New Kashmir Manifesto was to become a manifestation of the political ethos of Kashmir. As
soon as it was adopted by the National Conference, it acquired a stance of the  political vision
of the community as a whole. The  political value of this document  was not limited to the
specificity of the movement. It was to have a long-term political relevance for people of
Kashmir because it provided them a conception of a ‘New Kashmir’, a Kashmir purged of its
miserable past reminiscent of external political control, economic oppression and social
backwardness on the one hand and its loss of political and moral dignity, on the other.
Transcending the level of the political rhetoric, it was to catch the imagination of people - 
creating for them, a new meaning of politics.
This new politics, devoid of its narrow limitations of religion, was to create a sense of political
collectivity that was to inform the political consciousness of Kashmir, for the times to come.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 17
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 4 (1), 1995
There was no concrete idea formulated by the National Conference as to what would be
36
 the exact form of this self rule. On the question as to what was actually being envisaged by the
 National Conference - whether a form of an independent Kashmir,or an autonomus political unit
No more this collectivity was to be recognised as a Muslim collectivity. On the contrary, this
was a Kashmiri collectivity whose Muslim background was incidental. Its particular context of
an indegenous political movement against the Dogra rulers,  parallel to the Indian freedom
movement as well as to the Muslim politics of the subcontinent, helped evolve within this
collectivity, a conception of a distinct and a self-contained entity - that had evolved a singular
idea of  nationalism - a ‘Kashmiri’ nationalism.  
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In sharpening the Kashmiri political identity,  a number of factors contributed, the most
important of which was the secularisation of the political organisation itself. Though in its new
Avtar, the National Conference could not attract large number of Hindu masses either from
the valley or from other parts of the state, and though basically its sphere of influence
remained limited  among the Muslims of Kashmir itself,  yet, it was no more restricted in its
political agenda. Besides pursuing the goal of reorganisation of the agrarian structure, its
political energies were channelised in the direction of articulation as well as the projection of
the demand of ‘self-rule’. This demand was a corollary of a political discourse around the issue
of ‘political dignity’ that had evolved within Kashmir during this period of the political
movemement. The ‘Political dignity’ of Kashmir was projected to be compromised due to the
centuries-old external political control over it, of which the Dogra Rule was still  a symbol.
Dogra rule, in fact was portrayed as a mark of a more severe indignity of the community  - 
not merely due to its externality but because of the way it had come to acquire control over
Kashmir through the Treaty of Amritsar on the payment of a paltry sum of seventy-five lakhs
of rupees. Projected as a symbol of the enslavement of the community, this fact of history was
invoked to raise political emotions and organise a politics of resistance  with the aim of
reversal of such a history and the assertion of the right of Kashmiris to control their own
political destiny.
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 within the Indian state - there is lot of ambiguity. Sheikh had nursed the idea of independent
 Kashmir but at the same time had also expressed his apprehension regarding the possibility of a
 secure future for an independent Kashmir. Punjabi argues that there were two different shades
 of opinion about the future of Kashmir, one envisaging independence for Kashmir and the other
 leaning towards the idea of an  autonomous state within the Indian union. See, Riyaz Punjabi,
 ‘Kashmir Imbroglio: The Socio-Political Roots’, Contemporary South Asia, 4(1), 1995.
The discourse around the issue of ‘self-rule’, in the decade of forties,  secularised the political
language of the political movement of Kashmir and brought it at par with the discourse of the
Indian freedom movement. Secularisation of  Kashmir’s politics and an affinity of the National
Conference with the Indian National Congress, in fact, were related factors. By this period, 
there existed not only a close ideological proximity of the Conference with the Congress but
also a close association of the leaders as well. The leaders of the Congress like Nehru, Gandhi
and Azad had appreciation of the political aspirations of the people of Kashmir and their moral
support to the movement, therefore was quite forthcoming.
It was the cumulative effect of the type of politics being pursued by the National Conference -,
i.e. -  an assertion of the Kashmiri identity,  articulation of the demand of popular control over
political power, an insistence on the reorganisation of the agrarian structure - that a hiatus
developed between the politics of Kashmir on the one hand and the Muslim politics of India
(as pursued under the banner of the Muslim League), on the other. The fact that the Muslim
league was supportive of the right of the ruler, on the question of deciding the political future
of a princely state, made it difficult for the Conference to rely on it for the fulfilment of its goal
of the ‘power to the people’. The feudal character of the League was also suspect for the
Conference leadership. Its vision of redistribution of the land on the basis of the principle of
‘land to the tiller’ did not fit in the League’s ideological or organisational politics. That is the
reason that the Kashmiri leaders did not respond to the idea of Pakistan as the homeland of all
Muslims. They had their own distinct political agenda in accordance with which they
demanded a distinct political space, which was not feasible within Pakistan. Indian leadership,
on the contrary, especially Nehru and Gandhi, had shown a sensitivity to this Kashmiri urge
for an independent political space. So, there was an inclination on  part of the leadership ofQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 19
What went on in the mind of Abdullah at the time of accession, gets revealed from
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 the following narrative from his autobiography:
‘ I had my views. If we were to accede to India,Pakistan would never accept our
 choice, and we would become a battleground for the two nations. My colleagues felt
 differently. The Muslim League, they said, will always be dominated by feudal elements
 which are an anathema for enlightened and progressive views. The people’s vision of a ‘ New
 Kashmir’ will never be accepted by the newly created Pakistan. Chains of slavery will keep
 as in their continuous stronghold. But India was different. There were parties and individuals
 in India whose views were identical to ours. By acceding to India, then wouldn’t we move
 closer to our goal?
The other choice was an independent Kashmir. But to keep a small state independent
 while it was surrendered by big powers was impossible. If these powers guaranteed stability
 to an independent Kashmir, it was another matter.’ See, Sheikh Abdullah, Flames of Chinar,
 p.83.
Kashmir, especially Sheikh Abdullah, to prefer an association with India - a preference that
came out of a consciousness that the ideal choice of having a separate political entity of
Kashmir may not be a functional one.
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The politics of Kashmir in the period after the accession revolved around the factor of  the
assertion of Kashmiri rather than the Muslim identity. The discourse that had evolved during
the period of political movement, continued to have its political relevance, in the period
after1947. The political issues that emerged as the most significant for Kashmiris were related
to the politics of political dignity, independent political space and the self-rule. 
IV Reassertion of the Muslim Identity
It was by the decade of seventies that a politics around the Muslim identity started to assert
itself in Kashmir - though even at that time, the space occupied by it was quite marginal. Such
a space extended itself gradually during the next decade. By the time Kashmir came into theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 20
 Politics in Kashmir, in the decades of fifties and sixties was severely distorted on various
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 counts.There was a constant threat to the legitimacy of the government as Sheikh Abdullah, the
 popular and charismatic leader of Kashmir, was ousted and kept in custody, without a trial for
 a long time.In his absence, the local politics run by Centre-supported political elite acquired the
 manipulative and corrupt nature. The persistent interference by the Centre in the state politics led
 not only to loss of the autonomy of the local politics but also to a tradition of undemocratic
 political practices. 
grip of militancy, this space had enlarged itself substantially - to the extent that
fundamentalism became an important reality of the politics of separatism.
The process of reassertion of the Muslim identity in Kashmir is closely linked to the politics of
separatism arising mainly out of a widely prevailing deep-rooted discontent  against the
existing political arrangements. The major reason of discontent has been a divergence between
the political aspirations of the political community on the one hand and the content of politics
on the other. A distortion in the politics of Kashmir emerged in the early fifties, when the
National Conference, the major political agency of the community, lost its autonomy and its
politics came to be heavily intervened by the Central government. This had the consequence of
a loss of political space that the community hoped to retain for itself in its association with
India. Such a political space was very much required for the people of Kashmir  because they
had been highly mobilized during the decade of thirties and forties and had evolved an
indigenous tradition of politics. 
The arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 followed by the ‘Congressisation’ of the National
Conference and  the jeopardisation of the political autonomy granted to the state under Article
370 of Indian constitution, on the one hand, and the loss of credibility and eligibility of the
local political elite pursuing a politics that was essentially devoid of openness, dissent and a
sense of popular participation, on the other, resulted in a gradual erosion of mass base of
Kashmir’s politics.  Politics, thereafter, started  losing its meaning and relevance for common
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people. As the legitimacy of political power came to be challanged, an extra-systemic politicalQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 21
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39
 resistance from a small section of the leadership. Although those who were against its conversion
 were mainly the Jammu based Muslims, yet there were a few Kashmiris  who were also opposed
 to this step. Later, when  the National Conference was split by the Jammu Muslims to revive the
 Muslim Conference, Kashmiri religious leader, and the initial founder of the National Conference, Mirwaiz Yusuf
Shah also joined it. Yusuf Shah, at that time, had a limited hold on certain areas
 of the city of Srinagar. See, Riyaz Punjabi, ‘Kashmir Imbroglio: The Socio-Political Roots’,
 pp.39-53.
space was created. It was from this space that the politics of the assertion of Kashmiri identity
and its search for an autonomous political space gradually came to be organised. A part of the
extra-systemic space also came to be communalised. 
  
It is important to note that communal political response always existed in Kashmir’s politics -
even at the time when radicalisation of the politics had taken place  in the decade of thirties
and forties  - only  it had a very limited sphere of influence at that time. It had been
39
marginalised as a result of  the wider political response of a more progressive nature, 
generated by the National Conference. It was from this space of marginality, however, that it 
sought to assert itself during that period but failed to make any impact. After the launching of
the New Kashmir Movement, it had even lost its visibility. Such a visibility was regained, to
some extent, in the early sixties,  during an episode of religious nature which acquired definite
political dimensions. It was the episode related to the theft of the ‘Holy Relic’ from the famous
Hazaratbal shrine. The knowledge of this theft led to the manifestation of the Muslim
emotions of people on the one hand and the revival of the political importance of clergy in
Kashmir after a gap of almost three decades, on the other. This particular episode is important
for an analysis of the political psyche of Kashmir as it represents the first major manifestation
of  a deep-rooted mass discontent that had been accumulating for want of its expression since
early fifties. It was during this period that the institution of Mir Waiz, that had come to play a
political role in the early period of political mobilization in Kashmir, once again came to claim
its role in politics. Specifically, it was the rise of Moulvi Farooq, the Mir Waiz of Kashmir,
who became the head of the Action Committee organised by various political organisations toQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 22
 Balraj Puri, ‘Jammu and Kashmir’, in Myron Weiner(Ed), State Politics in India,
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 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1968) p.235.
 Alastair Lamb, Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 ( Karachi : Oxford University
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 Press, 1992) p.334. 
coordinate the mass protests during this episode. Later, he launched his own political
organisation, the Awami Action Committee. The Awami Action Committee was ‘the first
genuine Pro-Pakistani group of importance  and it attracted militant sections of population,
among the youth in particular, especially in parts of Srinagar.’  The leadership of Moulvi
40
Mohammed Farooq had significant implications for the politics of Kashmir because he
represented in his position as a religious head, a political tradition, that had originated in the
period of evolution of the political consciousness in Kashmir. This tradition, though eclipsed
by the rise of the National Conference, nevertheless, was as rooted in the immediate political
history of Kashmir  as the tradition represented by the National Conference.  It, therefore had
41
the potentiality of asserting itself, specifically in the reversal of conditions that had made it
possible for the politics to be secularised in the decades of thirties and forties. It was such a
potentiality that came to be realised later,  as the politics of religious fundamentalism overtook
Kashmir in the nineties.
It was in the decade of seventies that some impact of communal and fundamentalist forces
could be perceived in Kashmir.Among those who came easily under the influence of the
Islamic fundamentalism were the students and young people who were disillusioned by the
economic and political realities of the state. Such a disillusionment basically resulted from a
lag that existed between the aspirations of the newly emerging middle class  and the infra
structural facilities available in Kashmir to fulfil them. Kashmir witnessed a relative
mobilization in the post-1947 period, especially in the context of agrarian reforms and the
expansion of educational opportunities. It has been, as Ganguly notes, an asymmetry between
mobilization and accommodation that has resulted in the middle-class discontent.
Mobilization,  he argues, ‘set off other expectations and demands. Young Kashmiris acquired
a modicum of education and became aware of improved economic prospects. They were no
longer content to seek employment in the traditional sectors of economy, namely, theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 23
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handicraft industry or the tourist trade...’  The result has been a pressure on the governmental
42
jobs   Even in the rural areas, there has been enormous demand for the governmental and the
semi-governmental jobs both due to the money as well as the status involved with these.
43
Inability of the state to absorb the youth in the state services, inevitably resulted in their
indignation which came to be compounded many times due to the denial of democratic
channels of expression of their resentment.
 
It was in the context of the prevailing discontent that many a young Kashmiris got attracted to
the appeal of Jamat - e - Islamia and its student organisation, Jamat - e - Tulba, which were 
actively engaged, in the decade of seventies, in giving a fundamentalist turn to Kashmir’s
politics of discontent. Discontent of similar nature, in the period of 1930s, had been
channelised in the direction of left-oriented politics of the National Conference but now people
‘were more inclined to seek security in communal roots. Among the Muslims the fundamentals
of Islam became increasingly the basis of political identification...’
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Before making its presence felt in a big way, Jamat had been generating its sphere of influence
through the network of schools attached to mosques, known as Madrasas. These schools have
been responsible for the Islamisation of rural society and ingraining a secessionist ideology in
the common sense of the youth in particular.
 
The influence of Jamat increased in Kashmir in the decade of eighties. By the 1983 Assembly
elections, the presence of Jamat could be felt. Though it was not able to make electoral mark,
yet it had proven its capability of  catching  crowds. As people got more and moreQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 24
Lamb refers to the enormous influence of the Iranian Revolution and emergence of
45
 Ayatollah Khomeini on the world stage, on the Islamic politics of Kashmir. In his opinion, the
 Jamaat to begin with had been seeking an Iranian style solution to Kashmir’s problem. By 1983,
 however, ‘the Iranian parallels were probably of little significance; and the Jaamat-i-Islami
 remained closely associated with similar fundamentalist movements in Pakistan. One if itsleaders,
 Maulana Sa’aduddin, on a visit to Pakistan in 1983, however stressed that the aim of party was
 not so much to bring about union between the state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan (which
 it neither disapproved nor approved) but to secure the implementation of the will of the Islamic
 Kashmiri people: in other words, some forms of plebiscite.’  [1992:333-334]
Alastair Lamb, Kashmir : A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990 ( Karachi : Oxford University
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 Press, 1992) p.329.
disillusioned by the political scenario, it came to further consolidate itself.   Alastair Lamb
45
describes the post-1983 period in Kashmir as the first phase of a ‘general Islamic rebellion’.
Incidents like the clash between the supporters of the National Conference and  supporters of
Jamaat during a cricket match between India and West Indies, were, in his opinion, more than
a clash of parties on specific issues but a manifestation of an increasing disorder, of which the
‘Muslim Fundamentalism’ was a prominent feature.
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The influence of the fundamentalist organisations, especially in the rural areas, can be directly
linked to the failure of ideology in Kashmir’s politics. The politics of land reform which had
been successful in weaning away the role of communal factors in Kashmir’s politics in the
decade of thirties, failed to sustain itself after the initial achievements. After the radical start - 
whereby the big landed estates were abolished, the ceiling was introduced, compensation to
the expropriated landowners was denied, and land was redistributed to the tiller -  the agenda
of land reforms remained incomplete. Not only there remained a number of anomalies at the
level of implementation but also at the level of legislation. The net result of such anomalies has
been an economically divided society, with a large gap between the neo- rich classes both in
the urban and the rural areas on the one hand and the common peasantry on the other.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 25
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It is basically  the erosion of the peasant base of the National Conference which changed the
character of Kashmir’s politics. By the mid eighties, a substantial segment of peasantry had
come under the active influence of Jamat.  As the peasant support structure of the National
47
Conference was getting shrunk, that of the Jamat was getting extended. Though it never could
attain mass appeal or even mass influence, yet the  cadre of Jamaat could acquire a capability
to mobilize people in villages. 
It was because of  the political space created by the Jamat for the communal and
fundamentalist politics that a number of political and social organisations of communal nature
emerged on the scene by mid-eighties. Among the most visible among theses were the
Kashmir Liberation Front, the People’s League, and the Islamic Student Front. In 1985, it was
the Muslim United Front    ( a collection of Islamic and secessionist parties) that emerged as a
force to reckon with. It was a combination of thirteen parties that had proliferated in Kashmir
in the context of the emerging Muslim politics and it was led by leaders like Qazi Nissar
Ahmed, Prof. Abdul Ghani, Abdul Ghani Lone, and Ghulam Qadir Wani.  Though it might
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not have had the potentiality to occupy the mainstream of political power, yet it could have
made an impressive beginning -  had it been given a fair chance to face the electorate in the
Assembly election in 1987. Its failure to win the expected number of seats was to ultimately
lead to collapse of the very political processes in a short period of two years.
The fundamentalist politics in Kashmir that came to assert itself in the decade of nineties, came
to reflect itself in many forms. At one level, it was manifested in the mushroom growth of the
fundamentalist militant organisations, the most prominent of which have been the Hizb-ul
Mujahiddin, the Allah Tigers, the Dukhtar - e - Millat, Harkat ul Ansar, etc. The preeminence
of these organisations in the militant politics, especially the Hizb, has been an evidence of the
ascendancy of the fundamentalist organisations over those organisations which have had moreQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 26
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secular nature of politics- like the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front. These organisations
perceive the political  reality of Kashmir in terms of the Muslim identity of its people and
hence support either Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan or an independent status with the 
declared Islamic society.
At a second level, therefore,  the fundamentalist politics has been manifested in varied efforts
towards Islamisation of  the society. The agenda to create an Islamic society along with that of
the secessionist politics, was  pursued by a number of militant organisations in the early
nineties.  During this time, all those practices which were perceived to be anti-Islamic were
banned by  one or the other militant outfits. The bars, video parlours, cinema halls, liquor
shops etc. were forced to be closed down. Women were asked to veil themselves. It was in the
pursuance of the fundamentalist politics that the political leaders who had attained a reputation
of pursuing a secular ideology were specially targeted. The composite culture of Kashmir
came to be severely eroded as an environment of hostility towards the non-Muslim population
of the valley was created by the  fundamentalist organisations. The exodus of the Kashmiri
Hindus from Kashmir to Jammu and other parts of India, has been a result of such a hostile
environment.
To Conclude
The beginning of the modern political movement in Kashmir, in the opinion of Puri,  is traced
to a religious issue,  as a protest by the Muslims of the state against the desecration of the holy
Quran by a police officer in 1931. But as the movement culminated in the demand for the
transfer of power from a non-Kashmiri ruler to the people, and the transfer of land from
landlords to the tillers, it acquired a wider Kashmiri perspective.  In channelising the political
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discontent from communal response to the political issues of substantiative content, both the
leadership and ideology had an important role to play. It was Sheikh Abdullah who had been
mainly responsible for moulding the direction of politics, giving it a secular and radical shape.
He was successful in controlling the Islamic component of Kashmir’s politics in the later
period as well. Even when he was not in power, he could check the communal influenceQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 27
because he still represented a vision of New Kashmir.Though this vision had become quite
compromised by the mid seventies when he came back into power, yet he continued to
symbolise the political tradition that had taken shape in the forties. His death created a void in
Kashmir’s politics- a void both of leadership as well as of political tradition. This void took
place at a time when  politics in Kashmir had been completely distorted and its ideological
vision was almost totally discarded.  One of the major implications of such a distorted nature
of politics for Kashmir therefore was a  widening of space for communal politics and assertion
of communal political identity of masses -  ultimately making it feasible for the fundamentalist
forces to sway the politics of discontent.
It is important to analyse the long-term impact of the fundamentalist politics on the political
psyche of Kashmir on the one hand and on the question of political identity, on the other. It
cannot be ignored that the politics that took a turn in the early seventies has made a space for
the Islamised political responses. Not only there has been a sufficient assertion of the Muslim
political identity but there has also been a relative erosion of  the secular political ethos. Yet, it
is difficult to argue  that fundamentalism has completely overtaken the politics of
‘Kashmiriyat’or that the politics of Kashmir in its totality has come to reflect the Muslim
identity of Kashmiris.Puri has sought to explain the Kashmiri identification with the Muslim
politics as a reaction of any other Muslim community perceiving a threat to their identity from
diverse directions. He has expressed the hope that the Kashmiri people would not  submerge
their Kashmiri identity in the name of Islam.  This hope to a large extent, is also reflective of 
the political reality of the time as well. This political reality can be perceived with reference to
the multiple political responses available in Kashmir. Of these responses, the communal and
fundamentalist response is merely one. The other responses are not necessarily articulated in
communal terms. There are political organisations, both within the systemic and extra-
systemic space that seeks to raise the political issues within the secular framework.  The basic
issue for the people  still remains  the right of the political community to determine its own
political future. The logic of Kashmir’s politics, therefore, continues to be governed by the
demand of ‘self-rule’ and the  political  responses of people of Kashmir are expressed mainly
in terms of ‘Azadi’ or ‘autonomy’. Though the communal and fundamentalist forces have
sought to direct this issue in terms of an Islamic future for Kashmir, yet the mainstreamQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS19 28
political response to the question of self-rule, remains, more or less, non-communal. People of
Kashmir see their  political future mainly in terms of a ‘political community of Kashmiris’.
Though as a process of sharpening of their Muslim identity, this political community may
choose to perceive itself as the ‘political community of Kashmiri Muslims’, yet the fact
remains that in this political community of Kashmir Muslims there is a definite emphasis on the
Kashmiri component of the identity. For the people of Kashmir, their Kashmiri reality is still
predominant.